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I. INTRODUCTION
An Iranian-born resident of Canada and an associate were recently arrested
by United States authorities in Vancouver, British Columbia and indicted on
charges of conspiracy to smuggle sophisticated American military parts to Iran
in violation of the United States arms embargo.' A New York Times and CBS
News joint undercover investigation learned that this was not an isolated case.'
Arms dealers apparently have found that the relaxed border situation between
the United States and Canada and Canada's unwillingness to support United
States' embargoes allow arms dealers to circumvent United States' arms
export control regulations.3 "The result.., is a steady flow of American-made
military parts across the border into Canada and on to Iran" and other
embargoed, terrorist-supporting countries.4
Emerging from this current arms trafficking is the disclosure of a loophole
in the United States Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the regulatory scheme
for the sale and transfer of significant military articles and services, including
weapons and other valuable technical information.5 Capitalizing on the
lucrative international arms market that has expanded significantly since the
collapse of the Communist Bloc and the emergence of new international

J.D. 2000, University of Georgia.
See Anthony DePalma & Lowell Bergman, Sneaking United States Jets to Iran: The
CanadianRoute, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1998, at A3. Lowell Bergman is the senior investigative
producer for CBS News. After the hostage crisis in 1979, the United States imposed economic
sanctions against Iran. A total ban on American trade with Iran was imposed in 1995 after Iran
was linked to terrorist attacks. See id.
2 See id.

See id.

Id. This statement was made by American officials and the Iranians involved in the arms
deal.
' Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796 (1998) [hereinafter AECA].
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markets in the 1990s,6 State Department officials have permitted a loophole in
the AECA to continue unremedied.
Assuming the United States intends to see that the objectives of the AECA
are achieved, several factors must be considered. First, the United States
cannot infringe on territorial sovereignty and compel other states to enforce
United States' embargoes. Second, the United States relies on and profits from
the sale of American-made defense products and services on the international
arms market. Third, while it might be easy for State Department officials to
close the Canadian loophole, such action is unlikely in the face of the severe
political and economic consequences that could result. Trade relations with
Canada and other states could be undermined, and the substantial harm to
domestic producers of defense goods and dual-use items makes unilateral
action to correct the loophole undesirable for State Department officials. As
a result of these factors, multilateral agreements with other nations may be the
only avenue for the United States to ensure that American-made weapons and
technology do not reach embargoed and terrorist-supporting states.
Following the introduction, the second section of this note gives a brief
history of the beginnings of export controls in the United States. The next
section dissects and explains the complex regulatory scheme for the export of
military and dual-use goods,7 the Arms Export Control Act, and the Export
Administration Act, respectively.' The fourth section discusses the many
amendments that have been made to the AECA and EAA and the result: a
loosening of export control restrictions to provide a more exporter-friendly
system and a reduction in the number of export-restricted products and
countries. 9 A paradox emerges from the loosening of export restrictions.

6 See Jonathan D. Westreich, Regulatory Controls on United States Exports of Weapons

Technology: The Failureto Enforce the Arms Export ControlAct, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 463,
467 (1993). American-made weapons and weapons technology accounted for fifty-one percent
of total deliveries of major conventional weapons in 1991. See id. at 464. Westreich contends
that as the number of regional wars and conflicts increases, due in part to the break up of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the demand for weapons made in the United States
will increase as well. See id.
7 See lain K. McDaniels,A Tangled Web: UnitedStatesExport ControlPolicy,CHINA Bus.
REv., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 36 (noting that "[t]he U.S. export control regime is a tangled web of
laws . . administered by multiple government agencies").
' See AECA, 22 U.S.C. § 2751-2799; Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 24012420 (1998); see also Trevor Hiestand, Recent Development, Swords into Plowshares:
Considerationsfor21st Century Export Controls in the UnitedStates, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
679, 693 (1995).
9 See Joseph Ira Burkemper, Export Verboten: Export Controls in the United States and
Germany,67 S. CAL. L. REV. 149, 150 (1993).
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While in theory United States policy aims to restrict the distribution of
potentially destructive weapons and technologies, in reality, the United States
is striving to maintain a global share in the production, sale, and transfer of
weapons and technologies on the profitable international market. This note
contends that this economic incentive is diverting the United States from a
consistent arms policy.
The fifth section of this note analyzes the Canadian loophole, from its
historical underpinnings to its statutory foundation and negative consequences.
This section also discusses the failure of State Department officials to address
and remedy the "Canadian Connection" problem.' Finally, this note argues
that it is impracticable for the United States to unilaterally close the loophole
in the face of an ongoing paradox between the competing and conflicting goals
of arms control and arms sales. Multilateral arms transfer agreements, and the
Wassenaar Arrangement specifically, are discussed as possible ways to
promote internationally the United States' policy toward arms reductions while
maintaining a share of the lucrative arms market.
II. THE UNITED STATES' EXPORT CONTROL REGIME: A BRIEF HISTORY
Preceding 1949 and the Export Control Act, export controls in the United
States consisted of wartime export restrictions that were lifted at war's end."
After the destruction of World War II, however, the United States chose to
retain its wartime export restrictions in peacetime. This was done to insulate
the domestic market from manufacturing supply shortages and to aid in
Europe's reconstruction
by controlling certain shipments of goods to particular
2
countries.'
As the Cold War intensified, a third justification for preserving the strict
export controls emerged: preventing the flow of arms and other "militarily
significant shipments from reaching the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and other communist countries."' 3 By the late 1940s, safeguarding national
security by prohibiting transfers of superior Western technology to Communist
states became the principal purpose behind export controls. 4

to Douglas Martin, The White House Crisis; The Mounties Are Told to Investigate the Iran

Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1986, §1, at 6.
" See Westreich, supra note 6, at 464.
12

See id. at 468.

'3 Id.
'4 See

Hiestand, supra note 8, at 690.
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Congress codified this policy of "economic containment"' 5 in the Export
Control Act of 1949 (ECA).' 6 The ECA regulated the export of United States
produced goods and technologies having any military use and "vigorously
restricted the reexport of such goods.' 17 Despite harsh controls' 8 that
sacrificed American trade and competitiveness for national security concerns,19
the ECA lasted almost twenty years.20 The act's duration can be attributed to
an intense, almost overwrought fear of communist aggression.2
Support for the ECA and its strict controls began to erode by the mid1960s. First, the need for significant export restrictions over scarce goods was
no longer necessary as Europe regained its economic stability.22 In addition
to increased economic competition from Europe, the technological advantage
of the West had begun to decline.23 It has been suggested that insurrection in
various Soviet protectorates 24 may have created a perception that the
communists posed less of a threat to the United States and a rebuilt Europe.25
As a result, the importance of American competitiveness and market share in
international trade began to weigh heavier against the once controlling national
security concerns.26 Congress responded to these competing interests by
scrapping the overly restrictive export controls and developing a new dualregulatory framework. First, to continue trade reductions in "implements of

,"Matthew W. Sawchak, Note, The Departmentof Defense's Role in Free-World Export
Licensing Under the Export Administration Act, 1988 DuKE L.J. 785, 789 (1988); see also
Richard S. Elliott, Comment, The Export Administration Act of 1979: Latest Statutory
Resolution ofthe "Right to Export " Versus National Securityand ForeignPolicy Controls, 19
COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 255, 258 (1981) (noting that "[e]conomic containment" is a policy
of protecting strategic goods and technologies to sustain a technological advantage over the
Communist bloc).
16 Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-11, 63 Stat.
7 (expired Dec. 31, 1969).
17 Sawchak, supra note 15, at 790.
's See Westreich, supranote 6, at 468 (noting that "the President... was empowered to cut
off the entire trade of the United States... and the penalties, both administrative and criminal,
were significant").
"9See Hiestand, supra note 8, at 680.
20 See Sawchak, supra note 15, at 790.
2 See Westreich, supra note 6, at 468-69.
22 See Donald H. Caldwell, Jr., Note, The Export AdministrationAmendments Act of 1985:
A Reassessment and Proposalsfor Further Reform, 19 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 818
(1986).
2
Seeid. at 817-18.
24 See id. at 818. Revolts occurred in East Berlin, Poland, and Hungary. See id.
2 See id. at 817-18.
26 See Sawchak, supra note 15, at 790.
The United States "recogniz[ed] the costs of
excessive controls" and looked to expand trade. Id.

ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

1999]

war,"'27 the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (FMSA)28 was enacted. It was
later renamed the Arms Export Control Act.29 Second, the Export Administration Act of 1969 (EAA)3 ° was passed to foster United States involvement in
the trade of dual-use goods, which are goods that have both civilian uses and
potential for strategic military application. 3 With the passage of this
legislation, the United States entered into a new era of arms export controls.
III. THE EXPORT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: THE ARMS EXPORT
CONTROL ACT AND THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT
A. The AECA: A Regulatory Scheme for Defense Articles and Defense
Services
The FMSA established a regulatory framework that served as the statutory
foundation for the current scheme of weapons transfer controls, the AECA.32
The AECA grants the president, as commander in chief of the armed forces,33
authority to regulate the import and export of defense goods and services "[i]n
furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United
States. 34 Defense goods and services are exports having a primary military
function or a strong capability of military use.35 All other general exports,
including
dual-use goods and services, are regulated by the EAA (see Part B,
36
infra).

The president's statutory authority to promulgate regulations concerning
the export of defense articles and services was delegated to the secretary of
state.37 The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) executes this

17 Westreich,

supra note 6, at 470.

28 Foreign Military Sales Act, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 (1968).
29 International

Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-

329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
30 Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1994)) [hereinafter EAA].
"' See Sawchak, supra note 15, at 790.
32

See Westreich, supra note 6, at 469.

33See U. S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
1.
34 AECA, 22 U.S.C. § 2751-2799, § 2778(a)(1).
31 See Hiestand, supra note 8, at 691.
36

17

See EAA, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2402-2420.
See Exec. Order No.11,958, 3 C.F.R. 79 (1978), reprintedas amended in 22 U.S.C. §

2751 (1994).
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authority.3" Power to administer these regulations was further delegated to the
Director of the Office of Defense Trade Controls, Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs, Department of State (ODTC).3 9
In accordance with the AECA,40 ITAR creates the United States munitions
list.4 The munitions list is comprised of all defense articles and defense
services that are designated by the president as subject to the AECA's export
regulations.42 Items on the munitions list are those which:
(a) [are] specifically designed, developed, configured,
adapted, or modified for a military application, and (i) [do]
not have predominant civil applications, and (ii) [do] not have
performance equivalent to those of an article or service used
for civil application; or (b) [have] significant military or
intelligence applicability such that control under this
subchapter is necessary.43
Intended use of the article or service after its export is not relevant in
determining placement on the munitions list."

" International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130, 120.1(a) (1999)
[hereinafter ITAR].
" See id.
40 See AECA, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1).
41 See ITAR § 120.2.
42

See id.

Id. § 120.3. The munitions list includes firearms; artillery projectors, including guns over
.50 caliber; ammunition and ammunition manufacturing machines; launch vehicles, including
guided missiles, ballistic missiles, rockets, torpedoes, bombs, and mines; explosives, propellants
and incendiary agents; vessels of war and special naval equipment; tanks and military vehicles;
aircraft and associated equipment; military training equipment; protective personnel equipment;
military electronics, including underwater sonar, radar, and radio equipment; fire control, range
finder, optical and guidance control equipment; auxiliary military equipment, including military
cameras and cryptographic systems; toxicological agents and equipment and radiological
equipment; spacecraft systems and associated equipment such as satellites and global positioning
systems; nuclear weapons design and test equipment; classified articles, technical data and
defense services not otherwise enumerated; submersible vessels, oceanographic and associated
equipment; and miscellaneous articles not enumerated which have a substantial military
application and which have been specifically designed or modified for military purposes. See
id. § 121.1.
See id. § 121.1.
41
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Any manufacturer or exporter of munitions list articles in the United States
is required to register with the ODTC.4 This registration requirement aids the
United States government in tracking those involved in the manufacture and
export of munitions list items and is generally a precondition to the issuance
of any license or other approval."
In addition to registering, and before the export of any munitions list
article, the AECA requires that the exporter obtain either a temporary or
permanent export license 47 from the ODTC. 48 The license application must

indicate the "country of ultimate destination" for the defense article that is
being exported. 49 In addition, the application must include an end-user
certificate, whereby the foreign person or country receiving the export agrees
not to re-export or resell the munitions list article without prior written
approval from the ODTC.5 0

4- See id. § 122.1 (a). This even includes manufacturers who do not export their products.
See id. The only exemptions are for (I) officers and employees of the United States acting in
an official capacity, (2) producers of unclassified technical data, (3) manufacturers and exporters
licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and (4) those who produce articles for
experimental or scientific purpose. See id. § 122. 1(b).
46 See id. § 122.1 (c).
47 See id. § 123.1(a). A copy of a purchase order, letter of intent, or other appropriate
document must accompany applications for a license for the permanent export of defense
articles. See id. § 123.1(a)(4). Temporary export licenses are valid only if the article will be
exported for a period of less than four years, will be returned to the United States, and the
transfer of title will not occur during the period of temporary export. See id. § 123.5(a). A
renewal of the license must be obtained from the ODTC if the article is to remain outside the
United States beyond a period for which the license is valid. See id.
41 See id. § 123. 1(a). There are a number of exceptions, however, to this export license
requirement. Approval is not required for the transfer of unclassified defense articles to any
public exhibition or trade show. See id. § 123.16. A license is not required for the temporary
export of not more than three non-automatic firearms and ammunition for personal use. See id.
§ 123.17. Also, an export license is not required for shipments originating in Mexico or Canada
that incidentally transit the United States en route to the delivery point in the same country in
which the shipment originated. See id. § 123.19.
49 Id. § 123.9(a). The exporter must determine the specific end user and end use prior to
submitting an application to ODTC.
so See id. § 123.10(a). This requirement is specifically for the export of significant military
equipment and classified articles, but the ODTC may require the end-user certificate for the
export of any defense article or defense service. See id. § 123.10(b). Moreover, if the export
is designated for a non-governmental foreign end-user, the ODTC may require that the
appropriate authority of the government of the importing country also execute the end-user
certificate. See id. § 123.10(c).
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The AECA explicitly prohibits the export and sale of munitions list items
to certain countries.5 ' As such, it is the policy of the ODTC to deny export
licenses and other approvals for the shipment, sale, or proposed sale of any
defense article or service bound for any of these particular countries.52 This
policy reflects the American motivation to keep militarily significant articles
and services away from states that are communist or terrorist supporting.
Any attempt to export or re-export a munitions list article or furnish a
defense service without first obtaining the required license or written approval
from the ODTC is a violation of the AECA 3 The ODTC has wide latitude to
impose penalties for export regulation violations. Possible penalties include
seizure and forfeiture,54 debarment,55 civil penalties,56 and the denial of export
licenses based on violations of criminal statutes.5 7
Seizure of defense articles may result whenever there is knowledge or
probable cause that a defense article is, is going to be, or has been exported or
removed from the United States in violation of the AECA.5 ' The defense
article, and any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft involved in the illegal export
attempt, is subject to seizure, forfeiture, and disposition. 9 Debarment occurs
when a person is prohibited from direct or indirect participation in the export
of defense articles or is prohibited from furnishing defense services for which
a license or approval is required by the ODTC.60 This is generally for a period
of three years.6 ' The ODTC is also authorized to impose a civil penalty for

5' See id. § 126.1. The countries currently include Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Vietnam. In
addition, licenses are denied for export to countries against which the United States maintains
an arms embargo (Burma, China, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro],
Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire) or wherever an export would not otherwise
be in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States. See
id. § 126.1(a).
52 See id. § 126.1(a).

The Director of the ODTC, however, may order a temporary
suspension or modification of any or all of the regulations in the interest of the security or
foreign policy of the United States. See id. § 126.2.
5' See id. § 127.1. Misrepresentation, false statements, or omission of material facts in order
to facilitate exports is also considered a violation. See id. § 127.2.
5 See id. § 127.6(a).
5 See id. § 127.7.
516Seeid. § 127.10.
17 See id. §

127.11 (a).

S See id. § 127.6(a).

59 See id.
6 See id. § 127.7.
6' See id.
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each violation of the AECA, 62 but the penalty may not exceed $500,000.63
Finally, the ODTC may deny export licenses to persons who have been
convicted ofviolating particular United States' criminal statutes." The ODTC
applies a presumption of denial to all persons convicted of a previous export
violation or who are deemed ineligible to receive an export license from any
United States agency. 65 There is an exemption, however, for persons who
demonstrate they have "(i) dealt with the causes that resulted in the violation
and (ii) taken appropriate steps to mitigate any concerns of the ODTC.66
The export regulations concerning the transfer and proliferation of
significant military goods and services, while important, are but a small part
of the United States export control regime. 67 Additionally, there are regulations dealing with dual-use and civilian technologies.68 It is important to
examine the controls affecting these particular goods because there is
significant overlap and confusion surrounding their regulation.69 Moreover,
the number of persons affected by both sets of regulations is significant.
B. The EAA: A Regulatory Scheme for Dual-use Goods
In 1969, Congress enacted the EAA7 ° to regulate exports that made
"strategic military contributions" and could harm national security.7 ' The
EAA acknowledged that extensive export regulations could be detrimental to
the domestic economy, and traditionally, the EAA has had a more economic
focus than the AECA.72

62
63

See id. § 127.10.
See AECA, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e).

6 See 22 C.F.R. § 127.11 (a) (1999). The United States criminal statutes include: The Arms
Export Control Act; the Export Administration Act; the Trading with the Enemy Act; Title 18,
U.S. Code §§ 793, 794, and 798 (relating to espionage); the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act; the Securities Exchange Act; Chapter 105 of Title 18, U.S. Code (relating to
sabotage); the Internal Security Act; the Atomic Energy Act; the National Security Act; the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. See id. § 120.27.
65 See id. § 127.11(a).
6 See id. § 127.11 (b). This exception does not apply to persons debarred pursuant to §
127.6 while the debarment is in place. See id. § 127.11 (c).
67 See Hiestand, supra note 8, at 693.
68 See EAA, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420.
69 See AECA, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796; EAA, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420.
70 Expert Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184,83 Stat. 841 (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 [hereinafter EAA]. The EAA expired in 1979.
7' Rochelle M. Tarlowe, Deregulating Dual-Use Exports to Russia: Is United States
National Security at Risk?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 959, 965 (1995).
72 See EAA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401(2).
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By the mid-1970s, the technological advantage of the United States over
the Soviet Union and its satellite states had diminished significantly. 3
Congress was urged to retain and, in some cases, increase export controls over
research and manufacturing information, so as to maintain or improve the
United States' advantage. 74 The result was the EAA of 1979, which replaced
the EAA of 1969 to become the current export control regime for dual-use
goods and technologies.75
The policy goals articulated in the EAA resemble those of the AECA:
preserving national security, enforcing and supporting various foreign policy
goals, and maintaining the United States' supply of scarce materials necessary
for strategic technologies. 76 Similarly, the EAA grants the president the
authority to regulate exports.77 Here, though, the scope of items regulated is
significantly broader and more encompassing than in the AECA.7 ' The EAA
controls the export and re-export of dual-use items, which are items that have
civil or commercial uses but can easily be put to use in military applications
or are items considered to have strategic significance.79 Generally, the term
"dual-use" is used to distinguish EAA controlled items that have both civil and
military applications from those that are weapons or have a military-related
use or design and thus are subject to the stricter controls of the AECA.80
The president delegated the authority over dual-use and civil application
goods to the Commerce Department,8 which in turn issued the Export

71 See
74 See

Tarlowe, supra note 7 1, at 965.
id. at 966; see also Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of United States
Technology - A DOD Perspective, reprinted in Transfer of Technology and the Dresser
Industries Export Licensing Actions: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigationsof the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 33-89
(1978) (comments by J. Fred Bucy, Chairman of the Defense Science Task Force on Export of
United States Technology).
75 Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified
at
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1998)).
76 See id. § 2402(2).
77 See id. § 2405(a)(1) (stating that "the President may prohibit or curtail
the exportation of
any goods, technology, or other information subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or
exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States").
718See Commerce Control List, 15 C.F.R. §§ 738, 774
(1999).
71 See Matthew H. Wenig, Comment, Exporting United States Products,
Services, and
Technologies: An Overview of the Regulations and Considerations Regarding Compliance
Programs,23 DENY. J. INT'L L. &POL'Y 569, 570 (1995).
80 See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-799, § 730.3 (1998) [hereinafter
EAR]. Whereas the shorthand term "dual-use" may be used to refer to the entire scope of the
EAR, the EAR also applies to some items that have only civil uses. See id.
S' See Exec. Order No. 12,525, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,757 (1985).
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Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the regulations of the EAA. 2
In addition, the Commerce Department created the Bureau of Export
Administration (BXA) to administer the EAR.83
The BXA is divided into two branches, Export Administration and Export
Enforcement. 4 Export Administration implements and administers the export
controls designated in the EAR.85 Export Enforcement implements the
enforcement provisions of the EAR and administers outreach programs to
promote the public's understanding of their obligations under EAR. 6 The
BXA also oversees several Technical Advisory Committees (TACs) which
consist of representatives from industry and government that advise and
8 7 assist
the BXA in the development and implementation of export controls.
The items subject to the EAR are substantial: all items in the United States,
all "U.S. origin" items wherever located, "U.S. origin" parts, components, or
materials incorporated abroad into foreign-made products, certain foreignmade direct products of "U.S. origin" technology or software, and certain
commodities produced by any plant or major component of a plant located
outside the United States that is a direct product of "U.S. origin" technology
or software. 8 The BXA, however, does not require a license or other
authorization for all exports or re-exports, just those for which the EAR
affirmatively states a requirement.8 9

82
83

See EAR, 15 C.F.R. § 730.3.
See id. § 730.1.

See id. § 730.9.
s See id. § 730.9(a). Export Administration consists of five offices: Office of Nuclear and
Missile Technology Controls, Office of Chemical/Biological Controls and Treaty Compliance,
Office of Strategic Trade and Foreign Policy Controls, Office of Exporter Services, and Office
of Strategic Industries and Economic Security Implements. See id. § 730.9(a)(!)-(5).
86 See id. § 730.9(b). Export Enforcement is organized into three offices under the
supervision of the assistant secretary for export enforcement: Office of Export Enforcement,
Office of Enforcement Support, and the Office of Antiboycott Compliance. See id. §
730.9(b)(1)-(3).
17 See id. § 730.9(c). TACs include: Information Systems TAC, Materials TAC, Materials
Processing Equipment TAC, Regulations and Procedures TAC, Sensors and Instrumentation
TAC, and Transportation and Related Equipment TAC. See id. § 730.9(c)(i)-(vi).
88See id. § 734.3. The only items not subject to the EAR are those that are exclusively
controlled by the following departments and agencies of the United States government: State
Department, Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Energy Department, and the Patent and Trademark Office. See id.
89 See id. § 736.1.
84
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There are four general ways to fall within the licensing requirement for
exports, re-exports, and other activities. 90 If the item being exported or reexported is listed on the commerce control list and the country chart indicates
that a license is required to export to that country, the EAR may require a
license. 9 The commerce control list comprises all commodities, software, and
technology controlled by the Department of Commerce and resembles the
United States munitions list in the State Department.92 The country chart is a
list of all countries charted against various "Reasons for Control" that show
whether a license is necessary to ship to a particular country.93 Second, a
license may be required based on the end-use or end-user in a transaction. 94
There is also a license requirement for all exports to embargoed nations. 95
Finally, one may not violate any orders, terms, or conditions under the EAR
nor commit a transaction while knowing of a violation. 96
Within the EAR, there are many exceptions to the licensing requirements.9 7
The exceptions allow for the export or re-export of items subject to the EAR

'0 See id. § 730.8(a)(4). This simplifies the "ten general prohibitions" that describe certain
exports, re-exports, and other conduct as "subject to the EAR": (1) export and re-export of
controlled items to listed countries; (2) re-export and export from abroad of foreign-made items
incorporating more than a de minimis amount of controlled United States content; (3) re-export
and export from abroad the foreign-produced direct product of United States technology and
software; (4) engaging in action prohibited by a denial order of the EAR; (5) export or re-export
for prohibited end-uses or to prohibited end-users; (6) export or re-export to embargoed
destinations; (7) support of certain activities by United States persons; (8) in transit shipments
and items to be unloaded from vessels or aircraft; (9) violation of any order, terms, and
conditions of a license or license exemption; and (10) proceeding with transactions with
knowledge that a violation has occurred or is about to occur. Id. § 736.2(b)(1 )-(10).
9' See id. § 730.8(a)(4)(i).
92 See Commerce Control List, 15 C.F.R. §§ 738,774 (1999). The CCL is divided into ten
categories, numbered as follows: (0) nuclear materials, facilities, and equipment, (1) materials,
chemicals, "microorganisms," and toxins, (2) materials processing, (3) electronics, (4)
computers, (5) telecommunications and information security, (6) lasers and sensors, (7)
navigation and avionics, (8) marine, and (9) propulsion systems, space vehicles, and related
equipment. See id.
9 Id. § 738.3(b).
94 See id. § 730.8(a)(4)(ii). This is primarily for proliferation reasons. See also id. § 744.
9' See id. § 730.8(a)(4)(iii). These include Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and
Rwanda. See id. § 746.1(a)-(b). Comprehensive embargoes and supplemental controls
implemented by BXA under EAR usually involve controls on items and activities maintained
by the ODTC in the State Department. See id.
96 See id. § 730.8(a)(4)(iv).
97 See id. § 740. Some exceptions include shipments of limited value, shipments to certain
countries designated as "Country B" countries, temporary imports and exports, and shipments
for the servicing and replacement of parts and equipment. See id.
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that would otherwise require a license. 98 A licensing exception may not be
used if authorization has been suspended or revoked or if the intended export
does not qualify for an exception.99 Moreover, BXA may revise, suspend, or
revoke all licensing exceptions without notice. 1°
As with the AECA, there are prescribed sanctions for EAR and EAA
violations.' ' The BXA has the authority to impose administrative sanctions
such as civil penalties,' 0 ' denials of export privileges, 3 and exclusion from
practice.' ° Additionally, United States courts may impose criminal sanctions
under the EAR for willful violations of the export regulations."5 Such illegal
conduct may also be prosecuted under other criminal statutes,0 6 with the items
to be exported subject to seizure and forfeiture. 7 Finally, the BXA strongly
encourages voluntary self-disclosure of EAR violations and considers any such
disclosure as a mitigating factor in determining what administrative sanctions,
if any, will be imposed.' 08
In summary, the first unilateral export controls in the United States aimed
to contain the spread of aggressive communist and totalitarian ideology during
the Cold War. This initial regulatory scheme emphasized foreign policy

98 See id. § 740.1 (a). The exceptions apply to exports that require a license under General
Prohibitions One, Two, and Three, and there are no licensing exceptions for General
Prohibitions Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, or Ten. See id.
99 See id. § 740.2(a)(1).
'0oSee id. § 740.2(b).
'o' See id. § 764. Violations include engaging in prohibited conduct; causing, aiding, or
abetting a violation; solicitation and attempt; conspiracy; acting with knowledge of a violation;
and possession with intent to export illegally. See id. § 764.2.
,02 See id. § 764.3(a)(1) (declaring that a "civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 may be
imposed for each violation").
" See id. § 764.3(a)(2). An order denying export privileges may be imposed to restrict the
ability of a violator to engage in the export or re-export of items subject to EAR regulation. See
id.
'' See id: § 764.3(a)(3). Persons acting in a representative capacity (e.g., attorneys,
accountants, consultants, freight forwarders) in any matter before BXA may be excluded from
any or all such activities by BXA. See id.
'05See id. § 764.3(b)(1). Under the EAR, a violator "shall be fined not more than five times
the value of the exports or re-exports involved, or $50,000, whichever is greater, or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both." Id.
'06 See id. § 764.3(b)(3). Statutes include 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy), 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(false statements), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (mail and wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. §§ 19561957 (money laundering). See id.
107 See id. § 764.3(c)(2)(i). This includes seizure and forfeiture of the vessels, vehicles,
and
aircraft carrying such items. See id.
,08See id. § 764.5(a). Voluntary disclosure does not, however, prevent transactions from
being referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. See id. § 764.5(b)(4).
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issues, often at the expense of domestic economic competitiveness and global
market share in many commodities and technologies. By the mid-i 960s, it
became obvious that the export controls of the 1940s were no longer realistic
as they had the potential to threaten the economic vitality of the country. In
response, the AECA and EAA were enacted, establishing a new regulatory
framework to balance competing national security and economic concerns.
While the United States has continually supported a policy of firm export
restrictions to reduce the likelihood of weapons transfers to threatening
countries, globalization of the world economy and the collapse of the Soviet
Union have encouraged a loosening of export control laws.'" In an attempt to
balance two conflicting goals, the State Department has created a loophole in
the United States' export regulations. An examination of the many amendments to both the AECA and EAA that have loosened export restrictions
illustrates the conflict between arms control and economic marketshare.
IV. THE LOOSENING OF EXPORT CONTROLS: A PARADOX EMERGES

A. Modifications of the AECA
In the early 1990s, the State Department made two significant changes to
arms export control policies in an attempt to narrow export restrictions and
promote the export of military goods and technologies. " First, the State
Department dramatically shifted its role from a controller of exports to a
promoter of exports."' It began encouraging the foreign sale of weapons and
a downsizing of the military
weapon technology to maintain profits following
2
and the resulting decline in domestic sales."
Second, the State Department modified the definitions of "defense article"
and "defense service" to exclude dual-use items. ' While the original AECA
based inclusion on the munitions list upon whether a particular item was
"inherently military in character," the changed regulations consider whether
an item lacks a civilian application or if it has a predominantly military or
intelligence application.'" This is an important change because it permits an
item with a civilian application to escape the AECA weapons controls that

"09See Burkemper, supra note 9, at 149-50.
"10 See Westreich, supra note 6, at 487.
..See id. at 488.
112 See id. at 492-93.
13 Id. at 490.
114 Westreich, supra note 6, at 490-91.
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formerly
may have applied to items with both significant military and civilian
5
uses."1

This change is best illustrated with an example. Glass-fiber technology is
used in the manufacture of boats and golf clubs. "6 Glass fiber can also be used
in the construction of nuclear weapons and to replace metal in missile casings
and airplane fuselages because of the strength and heat resistance of the
fibers. "7 Since the definition of "dual use" has been narrowed, this particular
glass fiber technology would not be subject to the export restrictions of the
AECA because it has a possible civilian use, even though it is an essential
component of numerous weapons systems and nuclear weapons." ' The result
of this change is that a greater quantity of articles and services with strategic
military potential are now subject to less restrictive controls and thus are
available for sale on the international market. This change clearly contradicts
the AECA's policy of reducing the trade in "implements of war." The State
Department defends these changes, asserting that such changes minimize the
regulatory burden on exporters and simply shift the control of weapons exports
to the Commerce Department."'
An additional justification can be found in the enormous profits to be made
for domestic producers of weapons and weapons technology on the international market. In 1991, the United States sold sixty-three billion dollars worth
of weapons and weapon technology on the international market, with over one
hundred countries receiving American made weapons. 20 The State Department adjusted its arms control policies to promote the foreign sale and transfer
of United States produced weapons and technologies, 121 signaling a decline in
the commitment to the regulation of defense articles and technology. This
clearly conflicts with the purpose of the AECA: to reduce the international
arms trade. 122 A similar loosening of export controls is evident in the EAA.

115 See
116

id.

See id. at 491-92.

...
See id. at 491.
..See id. at 492.
9 See Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 39, 280,
39, 312 (1993) (codified at 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(a) (1998)).
120 See Westreich, supra note 6, at 493.
121

See id. at 492.

See AECA, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (declaring that "[i]t shall be the policy of the United States
to exert leadership in the world community to bring about arrangements for reducing the
international trade in implements of war").
122
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B. Amendments to the EAA
The Commerce Department has twice modified the EAA to streamline
licensing procedures and encourage exports. 23 In the EAA Amendments of
1985,24 the Commerce Department expanded the scope of the "foreign
availability exceptions" 2 by shifting the burden of proof of foreign availability to the Commerce Department. 26 Previously, the exporter was required to
show that a particular good or technology was freely available on the
international market in order to qualify for an exemption. 2 7 These changes
removed restrictions on exports that hindered United States trade because
many of these goods and technologies were already available on the international market. Additionally, the 1985 modifications relaxed export2 controls
for shipments to countries with comparable arms control regimes. 1
Another move toward loosening export controls was seen in the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.129 This EAA modification "help[ed]
to level the playing field for United States exporters."' 30 The number of
countries subject to export controls was further reduced, and the policy
changes implemented in 1985 were expanded. 3 '
The loosening trend in export regulations is significant. It evidences a
distinct policy shift by the State and Commerce Departments. Because export
controls hinder the trade and competitiveness of the United States and the
financial gain from weapons sales is substantial, it appears as though a balance
between national security and competitiveness is no longer the ultimate goal.
Maintaining a global marketshare is now at the forefront of United States arms
policy. From this shift in policy, a legal paradox emerges. The AECA's
regulatory framework was first established to curb the flow of weapons

See Hiestand, supra note 8, at 696-99.
Export Administration Act Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120
(codified at 50 U.S.C. app §§ 2401-2420 (1998)).
25 Hiestand, supra note 8, at 696-97. An exception to certain export regulations is based on
whether a good or technology is widely available on the international market from sources other
than the United States. See id.
123
124

126

See id. at 698.

See Burkemper, supra note 9, at 171.
.2See Hiestand, supra note 8, at 698. This included countries within the COCOM regime,
a multilateral export control agreement among most of the NATO countries, Japan, and
Australia. See id. at 685.
129 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat.
1107 (1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1998)).
' Hiestand, supra note 8, at 698.
127

131

See id.
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transfers in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of hostility and armed conflict
among nations. The loosening of export restrictions to facilitatethe trade in
weapons is obviously at odds with this policy goal. The inconsistency between
policy and reality has not only spawned a loophole in the arms export
regulations, but also has encouraged State Department officials to ignore the
loopholes existence. As a result, United States-made weapons may be
purchased, exported, and then re-exported to terrorist-supporting and
embargoed countries. Such exports contradict the purpose of the AECA and
serve primarily to increase the profits of the American defense and technology
industries.
V. THE CANADIAN LOOPHOLE IN THE AECA

In May 1998, a joint investigation by the New York Times and CBS News
unleashed evidence that "a significant portion of the American-made weapons
and parts that Iran buys illicitly move through Canada."' 3 2 Iranian arms
dealers are apparently circumventing American arms export controls and the
United States-imposed Iranian arms embargo by utilizing a Canadian
exemption in the arms export regulations.'
The United States and Canada have historically shared a close relationship.
As peaceful democratic neighbors, the two countries have cooperated to reduce
border restrictions and encourage trade. Both Canadian and American customs
officials have acknowledged that "because of the closeness of the two
countries' relationship, the same sort of export permits necessary to ship [highmany with military applications] to other
technology products, including
' 34
countries are not needed."'
The foundation of the Canadian exemption rests on a long established
agreement between the United States and Canada. The agreement requires that
Canada, instead of developing its own military industry, purchase major arms
systems from the United States.3 3 The Canadian exemption in the AECA
grew out of the flow of defense articles and services from the United States
the "relaxed border situation" between the United
into Canada and reflects
36
States and Canada. 1

3

133
134
'3
136

DePalma, supra note 1, at 3.

See id.
Martin, supra note 10, at 6.
See DePalma, supra note 1, at 3.
Id.
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A. The CanadianExemption
The Canadian exemption is found in section 126.5 of the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the regulations promulgated by the State
Department to enact the policies of the AECA.'37 The Canadian exemption
permits the permanent or temporary export of any unclassified equipment or
unclassified technical data to Canada for end use by Canadian citizens without
a license.3 8 The statute states that the Canadian exemption does not apply to
"defense articles, defense services, or related technical data,"' 39 and it
specifically excludes nuclear weapons, 40 fully automatic firearms for end use
by anyone other than a provincial or municipal government of Canada, 141and
defense articles
and services for use by a foreign national other than a
42
Canadian. 1

The Canadian exemption can be interpreted broadly or narrowly. A broad
interpretation would exclude all defense articles and services, including the
ones listed. In contrast, a narrow interpretation would construe the statute to
specifically apply only to the enumerated defense articles and services. Since
the definitions of "defense article" and "defense services" were narrowed in
the early 1990s to exclude any and all dual-use goods, it makes little difference
which interpretation is used. "' A broad interpretation of the Canadian
exemption would likely include little more than what is specifically listed in
the statute as exempt and would still leave room for many articles and services
with substantial military application potential. As a result, the Canadian
exemption applies to civilian-use items with significant military capabilities.
Consequently, a greater quantity of strategic military articles and services can
now be sold to Canada and then shipped to terrorist-supporting or embargoed
nations.
Another pitfall of the Canadian exemption is that by eliminating the license
requirement, it allows exporters to ship weapons without indicating a country
of ultimate destination and without including an end-user certificate, both of

137See ITAR, 22 C.F.R. § 126.5.

id. § 126.5(a).
Id. § 126.5(b).

131See
139

140 See id. § 126.5(b)(2)-(4) (stating that nuclear weapon strategic delivery systems and all
components, parts, accessories and attachments, nuclear weapon design and test equipment, and
nuclear naval propulsion equipment are included).
141See id.
§ 126.5(b)(1).
142 See id.
§ 126.5(b)(7).
"' See Westreich, supra note 6, at 490.
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44
which are typically required to secure an export license under the AECA.'
The ODTC, the licensing agency that supervises exports, now lacks the
authority to deny export licenses and other approvals for the sale and shipment
of articles or services when they are bound for Canada. 45 Thus, it is more
difficult for the United States to monitor the shipment of militarily significant
dual-use articles and services exported to Canada and nearly impossible to
keep such items from then being exported to terrorist-supporting or armsembargoed states. Because a license is not issued, "there's no trail to follow
... and [the United States Customs Service] can't tell how much is leaving
Canada en route to other countries.'"
Canada explicitly states that it is neither a part of the United States
embargo against Iran, nor is it obligated to enforce United States foreign
policy. "' Canadian officials assert that, although their efforts are limited, they
do try to ensure that Canada is not used to thwart American export
restrictions.'48 Canadians are "taking very responsible and strong steps to deal
with the problem" but admit that these steps are not "100 percent effective. "' 49
The recent arrest in Vancouver brought to light by the New York
Times/CBS News investigation is not the first time the United States has
uncovered Iranian arms deals involving Canada. In February 1998, an
American man was arrested by United States customs agents after attempting
to deliver F- 14 fighter plane engines and parts to Iran by routing them through
Canada. 5 ° A Canadian businessperson was indicted for shipping embargoed
aviation parts through Canada to Iran in 1998.' And in 1994, an Irish man
plead guilty to charges of attempting to smuggle military night-vision goggles
to Iran by way of Canada.'52 The CIA reported as early as 1986 that Canadians
were involved in the financing of arms sales to Iran,'" and a United States

144 See ITAR, 22 C.F.R. §§ 123.9(a) (country of ultimate destination); 123.10(a) (end user
certificate).
141

See id. § 120.1(a).

DePalma, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting John Hensley, the former head of enforcement for
the United States Customs Service).
47 See id. "It's not our embargo, and it's not our job to enforce a U.S. embargo," asserts
Lynda E. Watson, director of the export controls division in the Canadian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade. Id.
148 See id
149 id.
50 See id.
146

't See id.
152

See id.

. See Martin, supranote 10, at 6 (taken from testimony given by William J. Casey, the then
Director of Central Intelligence, before a House panel in 1986).
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customs official has been quoted as saying that a Canadian connection has
been present "in roughly half the American arms and technology smuggling
cases to Iran since 198 1.'A 4 The man arrested in May 1998 in Vancouver
reportedly told undercover agents that "Canada is Iran's free-trade zone."' 5
Iran is not the only destination for embargoed American-made military
equipment going through Canada, nor is Iran the only country utilizing the
Canadian exemption to circumvent American arms export controls. Several
Americans and Canadians were arrested in August 1997 for an attempted sale
to Iraq ofAmerican manufactured military helicopters that Canada had labeled
surplus." 6 Only a few months later, a Toronto man pled guilty to selling six
million dollars worth of militarily significantjet parts to Libya.' 7 These many
examples are a testament not only to the presence of a loophole in the
regulations, but also to the State Department's reluctance to remedy the
loophole. As a result, the Canadian exemption in ITAR has permitted, and
probably even promoted, a "Canadian connection" for arms dealers to evade
American export restrictions and embargoes.
B. Closing the CanadianLoophole
Despite repeated instances of arms transfers to embargoed countries
through Canada since the 1980s, neither lawmakers nor officials in the State
Department have taken the steps necessary to alleviate this ongoing problem.
After the results of the New York Times/CBS News joint investigation were
made public, James P. Rubin, spokesperson for the State Department, said only
that the United States was "considering tightening [the] loophole."' 8 This
evasive and non-committal response, when combined with the continued
inaction of State Department officials, demonstrates the conflict between
policy and reality in current arms export regulations.
Theoretically, the United States broadly promotes a policy aimed at
restricting the distribution ofpotentially destructive weapons and technologies
to unstable terrorist-supporting countries. This is the purpose of the AECA.
But in reality, the United States aspires to maintain a share of the profitable
global market in weapon and technology transfers. Ignoring the Canadian
1s4 Id.

This statement is from Ralph Lopez, the Chief of the Munitions Branch of the United

States Customs Strategic Investigations Division. See id.
' DePalma, supra note 1, at 3.
156 See id.
157 See id.
'5'Slobodan Lekic, CanadaCalledArms Route to Iran, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 15, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 6665966.
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loophole allows international arms dealers to indirectly purchase United
States-made weapons, thereby significantly benefitting the United States
defense industry afflicted by the downsizing of the American military after the
Cold War. 5 9
The State Department could close the Canadian loophole by reinstating the
license requirement for exports to Canada or by reinstituting the original
"dual-use" definition. Such unilateral actions, however, are neither realistic
nor beneficial to the United States. The longstanding peaceful relationship
between the United States and Canada and the relaxed border situation make
it unlikely that the United States would revert back to an export license
requirement for shipments to Canada. Moreover, Canada is somewhat
cooperating with the United States to "prevent the misuse of this exemption
to divert items to third countries."' 60
Altering the definition of "dual-use" to exclude items with substantial
military capabilities would significantly harm American manufacturers and
exporters. By excluding civilian use items that also have a strategic military
application from the less regulated "dual-use" category, the number of dualuse items available for export would be reduced. For example, the glass fiber
technology previously mentioned would not be eligible for export, despite its
legitimate use in the manufacture of boats and golf clubs. Thus, not only
would the United States defense industry be hurt by such a change, but also the
many other domestic industries that manufacture goods or provide services
with possible military applications. Additionally, changing the "dual-use"
definition would shrink the United States' share of the international market in
such items and technologies as a decreased number of goods and services
would be available for export.
What about Canada's role in the regulatory loophole? It would be easy if
the United States could simply compel Canada to enforce the United States'
embargo of Iran and other terrorist-supporting countries. This, of course, is
not feasible. Canada's government, like the governments of other sovereign
states, is the sole power over Canadian territory and citizens. The United
States can only ask that Canada support the United
States' embargo, and
6
Canada has unequivocally stated that it will not.' '
The State Department is caught between the longstanding policy to reduce
arms transfers and the arms trade's substantial economic benefits. Given the

'
'60
161

See Westreich, supra note 6, at 493.
Lekic, supra note 158 (quoting State Department spokesperson James Rubin).

See DePalma, supra note 1,at 3.
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State Department's inability to resolve the Canadian loophole, an alternative
means to remedy this conflict should be examined.
C. MultilateralArms Trade Agreements: Can the WassenaarArrangement
Resolve the Paradox?
The United States has regularly utilized bilateral and multilateral agreements between and among states to achieve policy objectives unattainable
through unilateral action alone. This is especially true in the area of arms
control. At the beginning of the Cold War, for example, the United States and
its NATO allies devised a multilateral export control system to prevent
communist acquisition of Western military goods and technology. 162 Called
"COCOM," the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
successfully controlled arms exports for over forty years. 63 COCOM was the
"cmost important and influential international export control regime."' 164
COCOM was disbanded when the dissolution of the Soviet Union dramatically
changed the global environment
such that it was no longer able to meet new
65
post-Cold War demands.
Because the State Department is reluctant to act unilaterally to prohibit
exporters from taking advantage of the Canadian exemption, a multilateral
agreement may allow the United States to attack the problem from the other
side: the purchaser. Instead of tying the hands of domestic manufacturers and
exporters by limiting what can be exported out of the United States, a
multilateral agreement could effectively limit the items that can be purchased
by foreign buyers. An example of such a multilateral agreement is the
Wassenaar Arrangement.'6
D. The WassenaarArrangement
Officially titled the "Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,"' 67 the Wassenaar

162

See Kenneth A. Dursht, Note, From Containment to Cooperation: Collective Action and

the WassenaarArrangement, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1079, 1079 (1997).
163

See id. at 1080.

'"

Hiestand, supra note 8, at 684.
Dursht, supra note 162, at 1081. COCOM was disbanded on March 31, 1994.
See Cecil Hunt & Evan R. Berlack, Overview of UnitedStatesExport Controls, in COPING

165 See
6

WITH

U.S.

EXPORT CONTROLS

Series No. 748, 1996).
167Id.

at 25.

1996, at 11, 26 (PLI Corn. Law & Practice Course Hardbook
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Arrangement was established on July 12, 1996, at Wassenaar, a suburb of The
Hague, Netherlands. 168 Formally approved by thirty-three states, 169 it aspires
to be a "global mechanism for controlling transfers
of conventional armaments
170
and sensitive dual-use ... technologies."'
The goal of the Wassenaar Arrangement is to prevent the destabilizing
acquisition of significant military goods and technologies that could harm
international and regional stability and security.17 ' It attempts to achieve this
end by promoting transparency
and responsibility in global arms and
72
technology transfers. 1
A "transparent" goods and technologies transfer system, in theory, allows
countries concerned with the potential development of weapons from exported
technologies to effectively track sensitive or dual-use technology transfers so
as "to assess the threat posed by [the] unfriendly elements which import these
items.' 7 3 The idea is that transparency can simplify enforcement of export
controls among participating nations by improving negotiating opportunities
and countermeasures to prevent further arms transfers to threatening states or
unstable regions. 74 Wassenaar members meet regularly and voluntarily
exchange information to identify "acquisition patterns and clandestine
projects" and to ensure that weapon transfers and dual-use transfers are carried
out responsibly. 75 There is hope that such exchanges will "foster common and
consistent export policies"
while reducing unintentional undercuts by other
76
Wassenaar members.

See Dursht, supra note 162, at 1106.
See The WassenaarArrangement Home Page (last modified June 7, 1999) <http://www.
wassenaar.org/docs/indexl.html>. Participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement are:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States.
See id.
170 Id. at 1107; see also Lynn E. Davis, The Wassenaar Arrangement: Address by Under
Secretary of Statefor Arms Control and InternationalSecurity Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State
Dispatch, Jan. 29, 1996, at 19 (discussing the formation of the Wassenaar Arrangement as a
framework created to promote conventional arms transfer policies).
171See Dursht, supra note 162, at 1107-08.
168
169

172

See id. at 1108.

17' Hiestand, supra note 8, at 720-21.
174 See id. at 72 1.
17' Dursht, supra note 162, at 1108.
176

id.
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Participation in the Wassenaar Arrangement is non-discriminatory.' 77
Membership is available to any state that meets the specified criteria and is
supported by a consensus of the members.178 Eligibility is based upon whether
the state "1) is a producer or exporter of arms or dual-use goods and technologies; 2) has an effective national export control policy; 3) adheres to the
appropriate major multilateral non-proliferation regimes and conventions; and
4) maintains a responsible national export policy
towards the four... pariah
' 79
Korea."'
North
and
Libya,
Iraq,
countries-Iran,
Although Wassenaar is not directly aimed at any country or group of
countries, the "pariah" states of Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea have been
singled out for their "questionable commitment to regional and global stability,
ties to terrorist activities, attempts to amass weapons of mass destruction, and
suspected designs on territorial expansion."' 0 Wassenaar members are
therefore compelled to prevent these countries from acquiring arms and
sensitive dual-use goods and technologies for military applications.' 8 '
The Wassenaar Arrangement derives its force from the voluntary political
commitment of its members. 8 2 As it is not based on a legally binding
international agreement or treaty, a breach of the arrangement does not violate
international law. 83 All Wassenaar policies and resolutions are determined by
a consensus, with each individual member then responsible for incorporating
the measures set forth by Wassenaar. This arrangement provides individual
states with the discretion to finalize the decision to permit a particular arms or
dual-use transfer.8 4 Additionally, there is no obligation for members to
consult other members before granting an export license, even a license
previously denied to an exporter by another Wassenaar member. 8 5 Members
have, however, agreed to a "no-undercut" provision that obligates each state
to notify all other member states of a license approval "which has been denied
by another Participating State for an essentially identical transaction."' 86
Through the use of this transparent transfer system, the arrangement attempts
177See

id. at 1109.
178See id.
171 Id. (footnotes omitted).
180Id.
181See id.
182 See id. at I110.
183 See id.
184 See id.
185 See id.
at I 10-11. The issue of whether to include a prior notification provision was a
major point of contention in the Wassenaar negotiations. See id.
186 Id. at I 11. Notification is preferred within thirty days and is required within sixty days.
See id.
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to create a "disincentive for inadvertent undercuts" that would prevent
members from acting in conflict with the Wassenaar Arrangement's goals.' 87
E. Structural Weaknesses Inherent in the WassenaarArrangement
There are several structural weaknesses inherent in the Wassenaar
Arrangement that hinder its ability to be an effective multilateral arms control
regime. First, the large number of member states increases freeloader
opportunities for the smaller and/or weaker member states. 188 It may be easier
for these states to violate an arrangement obligation because their transfers are
fewer in frequency and number and their "transgressions are more difficult to
recognize."' 89 Second, the unanimity requirement for decision making
increases the likelihood of holdout problems.''9 Because all decisions must be
reached by a consensus, there is less of an incentive to participate in the
information exchanges imperative to Wassenaar's success. Why consult and
coordinate if it only takes one member, no matter how small or weak, to
disrupt Wassenaar's policies and procedures and become an obstacle to
progress? Moreover, the arrangement lacks any veto provisions, which further
hinders Wassenaar's ability to be effective against illegal and dangerous arms
transfers.' 9' A third weakness in the arrangement is that it fails to include a
prior notification requirement that would obligate members to consult one
another before issuing export licenses. 92 It is nearly impossible for Wassenaar
to achieve a truly transparent transfer system without such a notification
requirement.
A reliance on the discretion of each member state in a consensus system,
without a veto mechanism or a prior notification requirement, reflects the
flexible and unstructured framework of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
Although this framework aims to be responsive to advancements in technology
and crises that develop, the lack of accountability causes the Wassenaar
Arrangement to fall short.

8 Id.

See id. at 1112-13. At thirty-three members, the Wassenaar Arrangement is nearly twice
the size of COCOM, the previous multilateral regime. See id.
s Id. at 1113.
190 See id.
91 See id. In COCOM, "veto privileges... had been key to COCOM's enforcement." Id.
192 See id. at 1113-14.
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F. Why the WassenaarArrangement Failsto Remedy the Canadian
Connection Problem
The United States is making an effort to utilize the Wassenaar Arrangement's transparent transfer system to remedy the Canadian connection
problem. The United States hopes that by coordinating efforts with Canada
and the other Wassenaar states, a system of mutual disclosure can be
established that will eliminate the need for the supply-side regulations that are
so damaging to domestic producers and exporters.' 93 If this could be achieved,
it would no longer be significant if Canada or another state refused to support
a United States embargo because there would already be a cooperative effort
to reduce transfers of sensitive weapons and technologies to such terroristsupporting or "pariah" states.
The Wassenaar Arrangement, however, does not have enough bite to be a
solution to the "Canadian connection" problem. The structural weaknesses
inherent in the arrangement are too numerous and too serious for Wassenaar
to be an effective solution. Efforts at transparency are not enough to address
the "disparate levels of national export controls" that may give particular
members an advantage over other members. 194 Any state that pursues a "strict
domestic policy ... will be at a distinct commercial disadvantage" if other
states do not follow the same policies.' 95 Moreover, the arms and technology
industries are competitive, which only fosters an environment where
cooperation is difficult. The paradox presented by a commitment to reducing
the trade in military weapons and technologies and the tremendous economic
benefits to be gained on the international market is unfortunately a dilemma
facing all the Wassenaar states.
VI. CONCLUSION

The first unilateral export controls in the United States were enacted after
World War II in an attempt to contain the spread of communism during the
Cold War. Foreign policy issues dominated this period of American history
as economic competitiveness took a back seat to national security concerns.
By the mid-1960s, however, strict export controls fell by the wayside as
America's economic vitality grew in prominence.

'93 See Hiestand, supra note 8, at 721.
194 See Dursht, supra note 162, at 1114-15.
195

,.J

1999]

ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

The Arms Export Control Act and Export Administration Act were enacted
to create a new regulatory framework, balancing competitive national security
and economic concerns. These acts enabled the United States to continue
supporting export restrictions that reduced the likelihood of weapons transfers
to threatening countries while acknowledging the globalization of the world
economy.
At the end of the Cold War, the United States loosened American export
control laws in an attempt to capture a global market share of the lucrative
international arms and technology markets. The ever-present conflict between
national security and economic competitiveness yielded an inconsistency in
United States export policy, and the potential for economic gain began to
outweigh the policy commitment to reduce arms transfers. From this
inconsistency, a loophole in the regulatory framework was created. Arms
dealers, once cut off from American defense and technology markets,
discovered that they could use the Canadian exemption in ITAR to circumvent
United States' arms export controls. The United States State Department,
caught between national security and economic competitiveness, has been
reluctant to correct the loophole despite numerous instances and mounting
evidence of a "Canadian connection."
The recent discovery by a New York Times/CBS News joint investigation
brought this loophole in the Arms Export Control Act to the public's attention.
State Department officials, however, have hesitated in closing the loophole.
The United States cannot infringe on territorial sovereignty and compel other
states to enforce United States' embargoes. Moreover, the United States relies
on and profits from the sale of American-made defense products and services
on the international arms market.
Although it may be easy for State Department officials to close the
Canadian loophole, such action is unlikely in the face of the severe political
and economic consequences that could result. Trade relations with Canada
and other states could be undermined, and the substantial harm to domestic
producers of defense goods and dual-use items make unilateral action to
correct the loophole undesirable for State Department officials.
Multilateral agreements with other nations, and the Wassenaar Arrangement in particular, may be the only avenue for the United States to ensure that
American-made weapons and technology do not reach embargoed and
terrorist-supporting states. Efforts at transparency have the potential to open
lines of communication between trading countries and make it easier for states
like Canada to track shipments of goods and technologies with the potential
for military use. In addition, multilateral agreements spread the burden of
export controls among participating states. This can facilitate trade while
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simultaneously serving to monitor and prohibit the flow of significant military
equipment to terrorist-supporting or embargoed states. An effective multilateral arms and dual-use agreement seems to be the only way for the United
States to finally resolve the paradox with which it has been plagued since the
days of the Cold War.
The Wassenaar Arrangement, however, does not seem to hold the answers
for the United States with its "Canadian connection" problem. The structural
weaknesses inherent in the arrangement make it unlikely that the United States
will be able to utilize Wassenaar to close the loophole. Although the world
community is reaping the benefits of an open global marketplace, it is difficult
to enforce the corresponding duty to monitor transfers of weapons and other
items that may be used in the development of dangerous weapons. Only when
the State Department and the Wassenaar Arrangement participants act in
concert to stop the flow of weapons and technologies to threatening states and
regions can the loophole finally be closed.

